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Abstract According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition,
remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed
across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological
resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosoph-
ical debate has often remained at some distance from relevant empirical research,
while empirical memory research, in particular, has been somewhat slow to incor-
porate distributed/extended ideas. This situation, however, appears to be changing,
as we witness an increasing level of interaction between the philosophy and the
empirical research. In this editorial, we provide a high-level historical overview of
the development of the debates around the hypotheses of distributed and extended
cognition, as well as relevant theory and empirical research on memory, consider-
ing both the role of memory in theoretical debates around distributed/extended ideas
and strands of memory research that resonate with those ideas; we emphasize recent
trends towards increased interaction, including new empirical paradigms for investi-
gating distributed memory systems. We then provide an overview of the special issue
itself, drawing out a number of general implications from the contributions, and con-
clude by sketching promising directions for future research on distributed memory.
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1 Distributed Cognition and Memory Research
When different people remember how to get to a particular place, or share their mem-
ories of an event they all experienced, or locate a specific and complex sequence of
facts among some large body of data, they may employ significantly distinct methods
in achieving their aims. While some people just immediately remember the rele-
vant material all by themselves, others will ask for help, either relying entirely on
their peers or hoping to cross-cue each other’s recall; many will consult external
aids, whether general-purpose technologies or idiosyncratically-organized personal
systems; in turn, others may not manage the task at all until they put themselves
back into the right context, or re-enact a certain procedure or sequence of actions. In
ordinary thinking about memory, the notion that the processes of remembering can
be thus hybrid, involving differently-balanced deployments of internal and external
resources, can seem unproblematic.
From this point of view, it may seem arbitrary to restrict attention to processes
within the individual brain: yet this has been the strategy of many long-standing
traditions in the philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science of memory (compare
Butterfill and Sebanz 2011 on individual and joint action). It has often been assumed
that remembering is exclusively a neural process, occurring inside an individual’s
brain; that whatever the precise nature of the memory trace which carries or is the
vehicle of each enduring memory content, it is contained within and possessed by
that individual; that any psychological kind or kinds to be identified by the sciences
of memory will be wholly internal; and that external resources are at best cues or
triggers to the real memory processes inside the head.
In philosophy, the most notorious challenge to these assumptions arises from Andy
Clark and David Chalmers’ paper “The Extended Mind” (Clark and Chalmers 1998).
They argued that both cognitive processes (such as remembering) and standing cog-
nitive states (such as memories) can, in certain circumstances, literally spread beyond
the boundaries of skull and skin. In resisting individualism about memory and cog-
nition, Clark and Chalmers built their “active externalism” directly on an array of
earlier empirical and philosophical movements, which we survey briefly below. The
widespread influence of their controversial and impressive paper has occasionally
led contemporary philosophers to neglect both that broader field of existing research
on distributed cognition and the methodological component of their project in favour
of exclusive focus on metaphysical issues. A natural methodological consequence
of individualism is that psychology should be allied only with the neurosciences,
that mind and memory are to be studied by way only of individual behaviour and
individual brains. In contrast, Clark called for “a new kind of cognitive scientific
collaboration involving neuroscience, physiology, and social, cultural, and techno-
logical studies in about equal measure” (Clark 2001a, p. 154). But his critics saw such
moves as a misguided attempt “to turn psychology into a kind of anthropology or
sociology or ecology; and it just won’t fit. There already are sciences whose topic of
inquiry is the interpersonal and environmental. . . . There is no room for an expanded
psychology, no motivation for it, and no need for it” (Butler 1998, p. 222). Ongo-
ing debates over both metaphysical and methodological tensions, and especially their
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consequences for empirical research on memory, are the springboard for the eight
papers in this special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
1.1 What is Distributed Memory?
By remembering, we can—fallibly, imperfectly—keep track of states of the world
and sequences of events, including our own actions. We can, more or less explicitly,
use past experience to guide or direct present decisions and future plans. We can
maintain a more or less coherent and integrated sense of our own history and of our
place in social groups. While some of these complex and interacting functions of
memory are, arguably, unique to humans, they build on capacities for learning and
tracking which are more widely shared across species. Whatever their evolutionary
history, activities of remembering in human beings are (as we noted above) notably
diverse, often involving not only multiple interconnected neural systems, but also
bodily practices and external resources of many distinctive kinds. Such is, at least,
the view of theorists who see remembering as “distributed”, as spread over, coupled
with, situated among, or incorporating heterogeneous resources beyond the brain.
Yet it is a striking feature of human memory that we sometimes remember facts,
episodes, or procedures in isolation, while entirely alone, or independent of any
relevant current stimuli. Our capacity thus to remember what is absent was often
highlighted by early classical theorists of the cognitive revolution (Miller et al. 1960;
Anderson 1976), who saw memory as demonstrating that each individual carries
all the information we can recall around with us in the form of internal represen-
tations. While some theories of distributed cognition have been pitched as radical
and thoroughgoing critiques of such forms of cognitivism, in other cases they have
been developed more as natural extensions, or as critiques of mainstream cognitive
theory from within. But in either case theories of distributed cognition have offered
metaphysical and methodological challenges to standard forms of individualism and
internalism: they have claimed either that remembering does not occur within the
brain alone, or that it should not be studied by exclusive attention to neural processes,
or both. They have therefore had to argue that even when memory appears to take us
out of the current situation, in fact the processes involved can still often be distributed
across disparate resources (Sutton 2009).
1.2 Distributed Cognition: Background and History
A full history of distributed cognition and memory research would recover concep-
tual links between three great precursors in the first half of the 20th century who
addressed this challenge in different but arguably compatible ways: the English psy-
chologist (Bartlett 1995/1932), the French social theorist (Halbwachs 1992), and
the Soviet developmental psychologist (Vygotsky 1978). But the modern history of
ideas about distributed memory dates from the 1970s and especially the 1980s. In
that period, for independent reasons in cognitive psychology, sociology, and devel-
opmental psychology respectively, the works of these three predecessors began to
be integrated afresh into mainstream debates (Sutton 2009). Bartlett’s account of
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individual remembering as the context-dependent reconstruction of momentary pat-
terns from fragmentary, interest-ridden traces and schemas was taken up by both
cognitivist and ecological psychologists interested in the limits and consequences of
constructive processes (Neisser 1997; Saito 2000). A multifaceted “memory boom”
in social and cultural theory brought Halbwachs’ difficult ideas about the social
frameworks of memory and the role of social groups in reconstructing the past back
to the heart of the social sciences (Olick and Joyce 1998). And, as well as Vygotsky’s
direct and ongoing influence on developmental psychology, his accounts of thinking
and “self-instruction” were taken up by the “new connectionists”. In addition to their
thoroughly constructivist models of memory, one influential section of the 1986 vol-
umes on Parallel Distributed Processing linked Vygotsky to a discussion of the role
of external representations in reasoning. To solve complex multiplication problems,
for example, we use our trained-up, culturally-sanctioned skills to write down the
sums in particular ways, manipulating and then iteratively processing environmen-
tal representations (Rumelhart et al. 1986, pp. 44–48). As well as turning problems
into simpler pattern-matching or pattern-transformation tasks which we can perform
unaided, such systematic practices of (external) symbol processing are the source of
any capacities we develop to do mental arithmetic, or perform other complex sym-
bolic operations, without those symbolic and environmental supports. The imagined
representations or models on which we then come to be able to operate derive from
our experience with actual models in the external environment, which can thus be
seen as “a key extension to our mind” (Rumelhart et al. 1986, p. 46).
This connectionist movement was one of a number of independent developments
in empirical, computational, and theoretical cognitive science which by the 1980s
saw researchers increasingly liberalize their conceptual and methodological toolkit,
as classical individualist Artificial Intelligence failed to make progress as swiftly and
successfully as had been hoped (Boden 2006). Distributed cognition emerged from
a range of traditions which were differently placed in relation to mainstream cogni-
tive science. Alliances with dynamical systems theory arose, for example, within the
cognitive sciences. Developmental and cultural psychologists had pushed further on
Vygotskian ideas about the role of adults in helping children negotiate the zone of
proximal development, until Bruner and colleagues introduced the notion of “scaf-
folding”. This was intended to capture the ways in which external resources (whether
physical, technological, or social) can mould or orchestrate actions beyond a learner’s
current level of unassisted performance (Wood et al. 1976; Greenfield 1984). Into
the 1990s, this tradition merged with developmental research on domains from motor
performance to reasoning couched in the framework of dynamical systems the-
ory (Thelen and Smith 1994; Clark 1997, pp. 35–47). It also shaped a continuous
body of social-interactionist work on children’s language and memory, which argued
that specific qualities of parents’ talk about the past with pre-schoolers plays direct
and constructive roles in sculpting their children’s autobiographical memory capac-
ities (Nelson and Fivush 2004). Our more sophisticated capacities for thinking and
remembering, on such views, soak in from the socially-available models to which our
biological mechanisms are especially attuned.
Other fields which had been in some ways more marginal during the earlier phases
of the cognitive revolution also contributed to a new focus, in the 1980s and early
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1990s, on the rich interactions between thinkers and their environments, and on the
contexts in which cognitive processes occurred. Anthropology, education, media the-
ory, and design had been to differing degrees “missing disciplines” (Boden 2006)
in the putatively multidisciplinary project, despite their relevance to the study of
human thinking, remembering, problem-solving, learning, and communicating. The-
orists in these domains, and in emerging hybrid disciplines such as human-computer
interaction (HCI), sought to integrate the new directions in cognitive theory with the
substantial and independent bodies of empirical and ethnographic research in their
home fields (Agre and Chapman 1989; Clancey 2009; Lave 1988; Norman 1993;
Rogoff 1991; Rogoff and Lave 1984; Rogers 1997; Salomon 1993; Suchman 1987;
Zhang and Norman 1994). The development of “distributed cognition” as both the-
oretical approach and method was pushed ahead most fully over this period by the
cognitive anthropologist Edwin Hutchins and his colleagues at the University of
California, San Diego.
1.3 Hutchins and Clark
In a series of studies of practices of decision-making across domains such as navi-
gation in both maritime and aviation settings, software development, and air traffic
control, Hutchins and his colleagues analysed flexible and intelligent action as
involving the cooperation and coordination of disparate individual, interpersonal, and
technological activities. In more or less stable organized settings, groups and artifacts
form distributed cognitive systems which are collectively responsible for the emer-
gent overall behaviour of the whole. The cognitive scientists’ aim then is to examine
the microprocesses of interaction across the diverse components of these distributed
and heterogeneous cognitive systems, tracing for example the propagation and trans-
formations of particular representational states across distinct (internal and external)
media. Often no individual actor controls or even knows every part of the intelligent
process of (for example) navigation, let alone possesses an internal blueprint or plan
of each of its component: expertise is not a property of individual agents, but is built
in to the constraints of the system.
Hutchins published a forthright and striking exposition of distributed cognition,
in the context of his cognitive ethnography of navigation on a US Navy frigate, in
his book Cognition in the Wild (Hutchins 1996). The framework was then brought
sharply to the attention of philosophers of cognitive science when Andy Clark
adopted it as a central plank in his rich synthesis of the new anti-individualist move-
ments across the cognitive sciences, Being There: putting brain, body, and world
together again (Clark 1997). Clark saw distributed cognition as a natural extension
of the point made in much connectionist literature that order and systematicity in
human cognition and action can derive in part from the stability of our environ-
ments, rather than as a direct product or reflection of exhaustively-specified internal
recipes. Cognition might thus be multiply distributed, both within neural networks
and across bodies, artifacts, and social groups. As well as enthusiastically adopt-
ing Hutchins’ cognitive anthropological approach, Clark brought together evidence
and ideas from robotics, developmental psychology, dynamical systems theory, con-
nectionist modelling, phenomenological philosophy, and from strands of work in
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biology, neuroscience, linguistics, and economics in a dizzying integrative manifesto
for an embodied and distributed multidisciplinary cognitive science. As in the case
of Hutchins, Clark’s visions of new agendas for cognitive science were neverthe-
less couched in terms of tracing the computational transitions across representational
states, even if the transitions and states of interest were now often external. This has
occasionally seen both Hutchins and Clark attacked as insufficiently radical by critics
of the very idea of cognitive science, who have seen them as exporting or project-
ing the apparatus of internalism onto the social and public realm: but on the other
hand it has arguably facilitated the gradual adoption of at least parts of the distributed
cognition framework in mainstream cognitive science.
As Hutchins and Clark have each continued to develop their research programs in
new directions, there have recently been signs of some divergences concerning just
how and at which timescales culture and mind interact (Hutchins 2011; Clark 2011).
But their earlier canonical presentations of distributed cognition have some further
common features which are worth noting here. Firstly, although both Hutchins and
Clark have been particularly interested in the specifically technological mediation
of cognitive processes, sometimes focussing on highly sophisticated computational
artifacts, they both clearly intend the framework also to apply to other dimensions
of distributed cognitive systems, both noting that most complex real-world cognitive
practices involve social and interpersonal interaction in conjunction with technolo-
gies and physical systems. Secondly, in some contrast to the way the philosophical
literature has developed in the wake of Clark and Chalmers’ defence of the extended
mind, both Hutchins and Clark took up the burden of showing that the primary
contribution of distributed cognition should come in the shape of the methodolog-
ical difference it can make to the explanatory practices of the cognitive sciences.
They each argued that the utility and productivity of the framework would be best
demonstrated by its success in encouraging and assisting scientists to study chang-
ing interactions between neural, bodily, material, and social processes in driving
cognition and intelligent action (Clark 2001b; Hutchins 2005).
Finally, the central route by which both Hutchins and Clark argued for distributed
cognition was by stressing the disparate nature of the coordinated resources in a
distributed cognitive system. Neural, bodily, physical, and social components of
such complex coupled systems need not be alike: rather, their distinctive features
and capacities complement each other in combination so as to realize the relevant
processes collectively. In particular, where the external resources in question are sym-
bolic in nature, the representational formats and the computational dynamics of such
external symbol systems will typically differ from whatever states and processes are
at work in the brain. Since both Hutchins and Clark worked within a broadly connec-
tionist understanding of cognitive neuropsychology, they did not argue for any deep
isomorphism of structure or function between neural and external resources: external
resources are alien but complementary, as Clark put it, to the brain’s style of storage
and computation, so “the brain need not waste its time replicating such capacities.
Rather, it must learn to interface with the external media in ways that maximally
exploit their particular virtues” (Clark 1997, p. 220; compare Clark 1998, p. 99). To
the extent that philosophical work on extended cognition has focussed primarily on
issues about the parity of, or functional isomorphism between, internal and external
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resources (Adams and Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009; Sprevak 2009; Wheeler 2011), it
has arguably thus shifted the central line of thought away from the original directions
of argument for distributed cognition.
1.4 Memory Research and Distributed Cognition
Both Hutchins and Clark discussed remembering at many points in these works of
this period, but it was not part of their projects to engage in detail, either critically
or constructively, with existing psychological views on the forms and mechanisms of
human memory. Research in the sciences of memory, indeed, had a quite independent
history in these decades, often somewhat apart from other mainstream movements in
the cognitive sciences. It was only slowly, for example, over the course of the 1980s
and especially the 1990s, that autobiographical (or personal or experiential) mem-
ory became a widely acceptable topic in cognitive psychology (Conway 1990). And
while debates about ecological validity in memory research had been particularly
heated (see Barnier 2012), one of their effects was to forge tight links between basic
experimental work on memory in the laboratory, and applied or “everyday” mem-
ory research: the influential Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
(SARMAC), for example, was founded in 1994 after the 3rd major international
conference on Practical Aspects of Memory.
In certain respects, then, some methodological and institutional preconditions
were in place early for potential interactions between cognitive approaches to mem-
ory and the distributed cognition frameworks. However, in practice, these interactions
were slow to build. We can see this by sketching the fate of two theoretical initiatives
which might have had earlier influence on mainstream psychologies of memory than
they did. Daniel Wegner and his colleagues, in a series of ambitious papers published
in the 1980s, developed a theory of Transactive Memory Systems (Wegner 1987;
Wegner et al. 1985). Focussing especially on long-term intimate couples, Wegner and
colleagues argued that over the course of a rich shared history, dyads and other small
groups can develop complex forms of cognitive interdependence. A transactive mem-
ory system, in Wegner’s terms, is a set of individual memory systems along with the
established systems of communication between those individuals. Transactive mem-
ories reside in the memories of both individuals when considered as a combined
system, given their shared awareness of the way information is distributed within the
group, which can take more or less differentiated and specialized forms. Although
Wegner suggested a number of natural directions for testing these ideas, they had
surprisingly little influence in the cognitive or social psychology of memory, instead
being taken up for many years almost exclusively in organizational psychology and
in studies of memory and performance in work groups and teams. As a number of
papers in this special issue show, however, transactive memory systems theory has
taken on a new lease of life in recent years (see especially Theiner and Tollefsen,
Dale, and Paxton). It has come back into cognitive psychology, in part, after being
discussed in philosophy and social ontology (Tollefsen 2006; Barnier et al. 2008),
while Wegner and colleagues have extended their own original focus on socially dis-
tributed remembering to look at our cognitive interdependence with the extended
bodies of information available to us online (Sparrow et al. 2011).
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A second, distinct line of thought in which human memory was seen within some-
thing like a distributed cognition framework was in Merlin Donald’s book Origins
of the Modern Mind (Donald 1991). Donald coined the word “exogram”, by analogy
with the brain’s “engrams” or neural memory traces, to describe the external symbols
which we as a species have come to combine, manipulate, and rely on. Changes in
such external symbol systems since the upper Palaeolithic period have dramatically
altered the capacity and operation of human memory (Donald 1991, pp. 308–333;
Donald 1998). Identifying certain common features across the diverse history of
external representations—body markings, grave decorations, hieroglyphics, maps,
musical scores, writing systems, architectural diagrams and so on—Donald focussed
our attention on the new cognitive profiles that characterise creatures (and societies of
creatures) who can draw on these exograms in addition to neural engrams. Thoughts
and memories, for example, become more durable and more easily transmissible and
reformattable across media and contexts and are plugged in to vastly larger databases
of inherited knowledge (Donald 1991, pp. 314–319). In an important early philo-
sophical development of ideas about distributed cognition, Mark Rowlands built on
Donald’s work to argue that much of human memory is essentially (not acciden-
tally) environment-involving, and primarily consists in our ability to interface with
a range of different collective memory networks (Rowlands 1999, pp. 119–147, also
drawing on important work by Rubin 1995). Yet, again, Donald’s primary influences
were outside the mainstream cognitive sciences of memory, as he was instead drawn
in for example to extensive debates in cognitive archaeology with radical enactivists
and phenomenologists who thought that his focus on symbolic systems was still far
too close to classical cognitivism (Renfrew and Scarre 1998; Malafouris 2004; see
also Sutton 2008). This is a continuing dynamic in studies of distributed cognition,
with more ecumenical attempts to nudge mainstream cognitive theory and practice
out of its individualist methods rubbing up against various waves of much more crit-
ical anti-representationist movements. Theorists with backgrounds in long-standing
traditions of Wittgensteinian, phenomenological, direct realist, processual, or dynam-
ical/enactivist critiques of the cognitive scientific enterprise as a whole have shown
some ambivalence towards distributed cognition, which is not revolutionary enough
for their liking; such issues are visible in at least two of the papers in this special
issue (Dahlbäck et al., Loader).
But to return briefly to mainstream paradigms in the sciences of memory, further
impetus towards an integration of distributed cognition into the experimental cogni-
tive psychology of memory has come in recent years, by way of fruitful debates and
improvements in a number of specific experimental paradigms. Significant examples
are the collaborative recall paradigm (Weldon 2000; Harris et al. 2008; Rajaram and
Pereira-Pasarin 2010), and work on socially-shared retrieval-induced forgetting (Cuc
et al. 2007, and see the paper by Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst in this special issue).
Where some other experimental work on false memory has painted social interac-
tion as primarily a source of misinformation or memory contagion, work in these
paradigms has encouraged careful exploration of conditions under which systematic
reliance on external (especially social) resources transforms the processes and prod-
ucts of memory, for better or worse (Meade et al. 2009; Barnier 2010; Stone et al.
2012). The fact that there are natural extensions of these paradigms to study memory
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processes in ageing individuals and couples is another advantage. Clark and Chalmers
rested their case for extended cognition partly on the notorious Otto thought exper-
iment, in which the systematic use of external aids transforms the memory tasks
and processes of a man suffering memory decline: the thought experiment was not
intended to substitute for investigation of the actual compensatory roles of technolo-
gies and other people in scaffolding us against memory loss (Harris et al. 2011;
Drayson and Clark 2013; and see the paper by Dahlbäck, Kristiansson, and Stjernberg
in this special issue). Partly as a result of these recent movements, a number of well-
established cognitive, developmental, and neuropsychologists of memory now have
active research interests in distributed cognition and related theoretical frameworks:
in a recent review paper in the Annual Review of Psychology, William Hirst and Ger-
ald Echterhoff discuss work by Hutchins, Clark, and others, noting that “the extended
mind approach . . . places the study of conversational remembering front and center
in a way more traditional approaches to the study of memory do not” (Hirst and
Echterhoff 2012, p. 58).
2 Rationale for the Special Issue
In planning this special issue, we sought to reinstate the breadth of topics and con-
cerns apparent in this historical sketch to contemporary debates about memory and
distributed cognition. We wanted to build both on our own previous work (Barnier
et al. 2008; Michaelian 2012a; Sutton 2010), and on prior special issues of journals
such as Philosophical Psychology (Sutton 2006) and Memory (Barnier and Sutton
2008). Earlier versions of three of the eight papers in the current issue were pre-
sented as part of a symposium on memory and distributed cognition at ICOM-5, the
5th International Conference on Memory, at the University of York (UK) in August
2011. The largest of the ICOM meetings that have taken place every five years since
1991, this conference featured over 500 talks and 250 poster presentations. The vast
majority of research presented at ICOM-5 was firmly anchored in the various fields
of mainstream experimental psychology: cognitive, clinical, developmental, social,
personality, and comparative psychology, for example, as well as cognitive neuro-
science and neuropsychology. But in addition to the small minority of philosophers
at the conference, there was a striking level of new interest among experimental
psychologists too in the ways that remembering has not just neural but also bodily,
social, and technological dimensions. To enrich such cross-disciplinary movements,
we suggest that philosophers of memory and cognition need to immerse themselves
fully in contemporary psychological research, as well as in the methods and assump-
tions of other disciplines that can potentially offer empirical data on memory, from
anthropology to history and archaeology.
Ideas about distributed memory must both make sense of and, in turn, inform
empirical work in the cognitive and social sciences in order to deserve wider accep-
tance. Recent years have seen an explosion of more specialized philosophical debates
about how best to express and then to evaluate metaphysical claims about extended
cognition. The primary philosophical debate has pitched the view that cognition can
be fully and genuinely “extended” into the world against a more conservative view
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that it is merely firmly “embedded” in the environment (Clark 2010; Rupert 2009;
Sprevak 2009). A range of technical issues have arisen in these discussions about
the best ways to capture just what it means to claim that cognition is “extended”,
relating for example to the metaphysics of constitution, to questions about intrin-
sic and derived content, and to the basic issue of whether there is a single defining
“mark of the cognitive”. Others have meanwhile sought to distinguish and critically
evaluate a range of related approaches under labels such as “embodied cognition”,
“enactive cognition”, and “scaffolded cognition”, with considerable progress being
made in teasing apart weaker and stronger claims, and the central issues on which
disagreements lie (Rowlands 2010; Sterelny 2010; Wheeler 2010).
While we fully appreciate, and have sought to contribute to, these philosophical
debates, we see a potential danger in philosophical work exclusively remaining at this
kind of distance from relevant empirical studies. This is why we have pitched the cur-
rent special issue as relating memory research to “distributed” rather than “extended”
cognition, since the labels “distributed cognition” and “distributed memory” arose
from the rich interdisciplinary investigations we have described above well before
the emergence of specialist philosophical debates about the metaphysics of extended
cognition. We suggest that many important scientific questions concerning mem-
ory in relation to distributed cognition can be addressed without taking a definitive
stand in advance on some of the more technical metaphysical issues about the ontol-
ogy and location of cognitive states and processes: instead, in naturalistic fashion,
philosophers can work directly from existing and independently-motivated projects
and problems arising within the sciences of memory themselves. It may then turn
out, if excellence of theory is a good measure of ontology, that those metaphysical
issues might look a little different after the sciences have moved on. At least we can
hope to bring a wider array of relevant empirical evidence and examples to bear in
formulating and assessing our metaphysical views. As the papers in this issue attest,
there is ample work for philosophers to do in critically evaluating ongoing memory
research across the disciplines.
Ideally, of course, the metaphysical and naturalistic projects will be mutually
informative. Perhaps, for example, we can interpret recent metaphysical discussions
as gradually honing in on the identification of a key set of dimensions on which
real cases may vary significantly (Wilson and Clark 2009; Rupert 2010; Sterelny
2010; Sutton et al. 2010; and see Clowes’ paper in this issue). On some occasions,
remembering (for example) is a more shielded or isolated individual process, from
which social resources and material supports are firmly screened off. On other occa-
sions, both the enduring grounds and the occurrent processes of remembering are
more interactively spread across heterogeneous inner and outer resources: this is
perhaps more likely to occur among established, long-standing social groups with
a rich shared history, in which that shared past is regularly revisited and renegoti-
ated in interactive and perhaps contested processes of collaborative remembering,
scaffolded by the array of technological supports to which we are now accustomed.
Families reminiscing around the dinner table, friends sharing stories in the pub, work
colleagues puzzling over old decisions or conflicts, sports teams revisiting recent or
ancient triumphs and defeats, military veterans confronting the pain of shared expe-
rience, lovers retelling the precious tale of their first meeting, children learning that
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their own perspectives on past events may not quite match that of their parents or
siblings, or older adults keenly relying on partners, carers, or established systems of
notes and reminders: these are all mundane contexts in which, although our memory
systems are changing as our technologies constantly alter, we are accustomed daily
to spread and incorporate external resources to varying degrees and at many differ-
ent intensities. If we are as yet some way from a future multi-method science of
memory in which experiment and ethnography would be seamlessly interwoven, we
nonetheless hope that this special issue can take us forward a little towards address-
ing the challenges of relating or integrating analysis of the complementary neural,
bodily, environmental, and cultural resources which coordinate in so many cases of
remembering.
3 Overview of the Special Issue
The eight articles making up the special issue describe a broad range of approaches—
from experimental and ethnographic work, through computer simulations, to general
considerations in philosophy of science—to understanding distributed memory sys-
tems. Throughout the issue, there is an emphasis on interactions and points of contact
between theoretical work on distributed and extended cognition and empirical mem-
ory research, with some articles focussing on potential contributions of the theory to
empirical memory research, while others focus on implications of empirical memory
research for theoretical debates around distributed/extended cognition.
Two natural ways of grouping the articles are (1) in terms of their focus on
either agent-technology distributed memory systems or agent-agent distributed mem-
ory systems and (2) in terms of their focus on either metaphysical questions
or explanatory questions about the mechanisms involved in distributed memory.
Agent-technology vs. agent-agent systems: Arango–Muñoz, Clowes, Loader, and
Rupert focus primarily on agent-technology interactions (though Rupert’s argu-
ment is pitched at a high level of generality and may apply to both agent-
technology and agent-agent systems, and Arango–Muñoz proposes a framework
which should apply equally to agent-agent systems), while Dahlbäck, Kristiansson,
and Stjernberg focus more on cases involving both types of interaction at once.
In contrast, Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst, as well as Theiner and Tollefsen, Dale,
and Paxton, are concerned with distributed remembering in small groups of
agents. (We return to the need for work looking simultaneously at agent-agent
and agent-technology interactions in Section 5.) Mechanisms vs. metaphysics:
The hypothesis of extended cognition, along with Rupert’s alternative hypothe-
sis of embedded cognition, is a reference point for all of the articles dealing
with agent-technology systems, but, while two of these (Rupert and Loader) are
concerned with the implications of the psychology of memory for the meta-
physics of external memory (though these two papers approach the question in
radically different ways), the remainder (Clowes; Arango–Muñoz; and Dahlbäck,
Kristiansson, and Stjernberg) focus more directly on explanatory questions about
the mechanisms involved in interactions between agents and external memory
resources. In the group of articles on agent-agent interactions, on the other hand,
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both Theiner and Tollefsen, Dale, and Paxton draw on empirical memory research
to respond to ontological arguments against the existence of irreducibly group-level
cognitive systems (responding in part to arguments given elsewhere by Rupert), while
Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst draw on such empirical research to answer the question
of why humans engage in distributed group remembering.
3.1 Agent-technology Systems
3.1.1 Mechanisms of External Memory
Clowes is concerned with the cognitive implications of our increasing reliance on
novel forms of E-memory—new computer-based memory technologies (as opposed
to O-memory: internal, organic or bio-memory (Kalnikaitė and Whittaker 2008; Bell
and Gemmell 2009; Smart 2012)). Critics (see Carr 2010 for one prominent example)
have voiced a number of worries about this tendency, but the general thrust is that it
leads to cognitive diminishment; Clowes responds to this diminishment argument by
examining the factors determining the extent to which external memory technologies
can achieve cognitive incorporation, and explores the implications of the hypothesis
of extended cognition (HEC) (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2003) and the alterna-
tive hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC) (Rupert 2004, 2009) for the effects
of incorporation. E-memory is characterized by a cluster of distinctive features—
totality, practical cognitive incorporability, autonomy, and entanglement—which
jointly determine the likelihood of its achieving deep cognitive incorporation (see
also Heersmink 2012) and thereby transforming our cognitive profiles in important
ways. While totality and practical cognitive incorporability encourage incorporation,
autonomy and entanglement pull in the opposite direction, suggesting that we are
likely to continue to rely heavily on E-memory, even as it is unlikely to achieve deep
incorporation. Clowes argues that HEC may be better positioned than HEMC when
it comes to avoiding an overly pessimistic interpretation of our increasing reliance on
E-memory, since the former can acknowledge that an extended system (agent + E-
memory device) may be capable of more than a nonextended system (agent alone),
whereas the latter appears to be committed to the view that increased reliance on
E-memory involves a diminished level of cognitive activity in the agent, the only
cognitive system that it acknowledges.
Arango–Muñoz, like Clowes, adopts an optimistic view of our increasing reliance
on novel forms of E-memory, but his optimism is based not on HEC (he works
within Sterelny’s alternative scaffolded cognition framework (Sterelny 2010), which
assumes that, while more modest forms of cognitive scaffolding are commonplace,
bona fide cognitive extension is rare) but rather on an investigation of the role of
metacognition in agent-E-memory interactions. He describes generalized versions
of the selection problem and the endorsement problem (Michaelian 2012b): When
confronted with a given cognitive problem, how does the agent decide whether to
solve it using an internal resource or, instead, an external resource? When infor-
mation has been retrieved from a given internal or external resource, how does the
agent determine whether to endorse it? Arango–Muñoz argues that agents solve both
the internal and the external versions of these problems by relying on metacognitive
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feelings—phenomenal feelings produced by subpersonal monitoring and control of
cognitive processes (e.g., the feeling of knowing, the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon)
(De Sousa 2008; Dokic 2012; Proust 2007). On this view, agents are able to manage
the trade-off between internal and external memory in the apparently adaptive man-
ner described, for example, in Sparrow et al.’s recent study (Sparrow et al. 2011),
due to the reliability of metacognitive feelings (Reber and Unkelbach 2010), along
with their ability to take into account both the reliability of the internal and exter-
nal sources available to them and the costs involved in accessing internal vs. external
sources.
Arango–Muñoz’s focus on the role of the interplay between internal and external
memory in achieving adaptive remembering is shared by Dahlbäck, Kristiansson,
and Stjernberg, who argue, on the basis of an ethnographic study of the mnemonic
strategies used by older adults coping with cognitive decline, that remembering often
involves a complex web of processes drawing on both internal and external resources,
including both external memory stores and other agents. Observing that the distinc-
tion between internal and external memory is often blurry (Sutton 2010) (consider
the case of the mnemonic for remembering the number of days in each month by
counting your knuckles and the spaces between them), they argue that research on
distributed remembering should focus more on the process of remembering, assign-
ing a greater role to the active, structuring role of the remembering agent than has
often been the case. In their view, cognition should be viewed as being distributed
across the agent, the activity, and the setting (Lave 1988), and they apply this to focus
on how the activity of remembering is shaped and constrained by the changing nature
of the task and the environment, with the agent negotiating these changes in order to
remember successfully. For example, an older adult may rely on an external resource
to remind her to complete a task (a case of external prospective memory), but, antic-
ipating the possibility of failure, she may also set up an additional external resource
which will kick in if the primary resource fails to remind her.
3.1.2 Metaphysics of External Memory
This approach, with its emphasis on the role of the agent in actively structuring his
environment and adaptively responding to changing conditions in order to achieve
a resilient distributed memory system, would seem to take us well beyond the sim-
ple picture of the interaction between the agent and his external memory suggested
by the case of Otto and his notebook (along with Inga and her biological mem-
ory) in Clark and Chalmers’ original article (1998). Loader similarly argues that
the view of external memory which has informed debates over HEC rests on an
objectified conception of internal memory, which would better be replaced by a
conception of remembering as an activity. According to Loader, just as Otto’s exter-
nal memory is described by Clark and Chalmers in objectified terms, so is Inga’s
(normal) biological memory viewed as a sort of portable store that the agent car-
ries around with her. Loader argues against this objectified conception of memory,
drawing on a variety of theoretical resources, including enactivism (Noë 2004),
a Wittgensteinian/connectionist view of remembering as an activity not requiring
stored representations (Wittgenstein 1980; Stern 1991), and a Vygotskyan view of
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the development of remembering as a process of internalizing previously external
strategies (Vygotsky 1978). He suggests that, insofar as Inga’s internal memory is
notebook-like, this is due to her previous interaction with notebook-like forms of
external memory.
Responding to critiques (including Clark 2010; Menary 2006; Rowlands 2009;
Sprevak 2009; Adams and Aizawa 2008; Wheeler 2011, 2010) of his earlier argu-
ments (Rupert 2004, 2009) against the hypothesis of extended cognition defended
by Clark (and Chalmers) (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2003), Rupert provides
new arguments in favour of the alternative, less radical hypothesis of embedded cog-
nition, according to which genuine cognitive extension is possible but rare, with
embedding rather than extension being the typical case. The focus here is on a
reading of Clark and Chalmers’ argument for HEC on which it maintains that the
natural kinds investigated by cognitive science have both internally and externally
located instances. Rupert argues that, if natural kinds are individuated in a fine-
grained way, the memory-related kinds investigated by cognitive science are unlikely
to have externally-located instances. If, alternatively, kinds are individuated in a
more coarse-grained way, so that they are more likely to have both internally- and
externally-located instances, he argues, the natural kinds argument fares no better:
the generic kind “memory” seems to play no explanatory role in cognitive science,
and the disunity of human memory may suggest that a coherent science of memory as
such is impossible. Rupert also considers the role of the so-called “Martian intuition”
in the extended cognition debate, arguing that it cannot provide significant support
for HEC, before turning his attention to the existence of a generic kind “cognition”;
he argues for scepticism on this front, suggesting that current cognitive science is
largely about specifically human cognition.
3.2 Agent-agent Systems
3.2.1 Mechanisms of Group Memory
Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst focus on distributed conversational remembering in
small groups, drawing on current experimental and simulation-based work to argue
that distributed remembering is adaptive not, as the focus of much of the litera-
ture would suggest, due primarily to its beneficial effects on individual memory, but
rather because it promotes sociality, promoting mnemonic convergence and thereby
contributing to the formation of collective memory, which is crucial to humans as a
social species. As Theiner also emphasizes (see below), distributed remembering has
cognitive costs as well as cognitive benefits. Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst focus here
on two apparent costs of distributed remembering: social contagion (Roediger et al.
2001) and socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting (SS-RIF) (Cuc et al. 2006;
Stone et al. 2009; Hirst and Echterhoff 2012). Social contagion and SS-RIF pro-
mote mnemonic convergence, the formation of a shared representation of the past.
And results of simulations suggest that, under the right conditions, this may hap-
pen on a larger scale, with SS-RIF propagating in groups of up to 50 individuals
(Coman et al. 2012). Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst thus argue that, though we will
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need to invoke additional mechanisms to explain the formation of collective memo-
ries in large-scale societies, our tendency to engage in conversational remembering
may well be explained to some extent by its promotion of mnemonic convergence,
with its resulting benefits for sociality.
3.2.2 Metaphysics of Group Memory
The remaining articles draw on empirical work on memory in small groups to respond
to reductionist arguments about group cognitive systems. Theiner draws on analy-
ses of mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of science (Bechtel 2009; Craver
2007), including Wimsatt’s work on reduction and emergence (Wimsatt 1986), to
argue that research on transactive memory systems (TMS) (Wegner 1987; Ren and
Argote 2011) supports nonreductionism about group-level cognition, in opposition
to the more popular reductionist view. Pavitt (Pavitt 2003a; 2003b), for example,
has argued that, given that the typical finding is collaborative inhibition, groups
do not remember more than the sums of their parts, so the notion of a TMS can
only be metaphorical. While there is also some evidence for collaborative facilita-
tion (Meade et al. 2009; Harris et al. 2011), Theiner’s case for a non-metaphorical
understanding of TMSs does not rest on this evidence. Contemporary approaches
to group cognition explicitly adopt an information processing perspective (Larson
and Christensen 1993; Hollan et al. 2000) and are thus compatible with standards
of mechanistic explanation, but they do not locate the mechanisms responsible for
group-level cognition entirely at the individual level, thus allowing for group cog-
nition as an emergent phenomenon. In the case of transactive memory, it appears
that the explanatory work is done in part by the organization of the individuals con-
stituting the transactive memory system, which means that a complete mechanistic
explanation of transactive memory will refer not only to individual information pro-
cessing mechanisms but also to the collective information processing that emerges
from the organization of the group. If so, Pavitt’s argument for reductionism about
group memory rests on a mistake: what matters is not whether groups remember more
than the aggregated memories of their members, but rather whether group memory is
an organization-dependent phenomenon that departs systematically from aggregated
individual memories; from this perspective, both collaborative inhibition and collab-
orative facilitation can provide evidence for the existence of irreducibly group-level
cognitive systems.
Like Theiner, Tollefsen, Dale, and Paxton appeal to research on TMSs to argue
for irreducibly group-level cognition, but, rather than appealing to general theoreti-
cal considerations, they rely primarily on empirical work on alignment in linguistic
and interpersonal interaction (Richardson and Dale 2005; Tollefsen and Dale 2011).
Alignment refers to the sort of dynamic matching between the behavioural or cogni-
tive states of two or more people occurring, e.g., in conversation, in which it can be
observed in everything from body posture to sentence structure to use of irony, and
which may be generated primarily by low-level mechanisms, such as priming and
the mirror neuron system. Tollefsen and Dale have argued that this forms the basis
for what they refer to as an alignment system, “a loosely interconnected set of cog-
nitive processes that have evolved to facilitate social interactions and joint actions,
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in particular” (Tollefsen and Dale 2011), and they here argue that further research
on alignment in the context of transactive memory may well support the claim that
alignment gives rise to group-level cognition, since alignment may be an important
part of the mechanism by which people become coupled to form a TMS. They argue
that, in certain circumstances, groups may achieve the sort of tight coupling required
for them to form cognitive systems—even in Rupert’s demanding sense, according to
which cognitive systems must be persistent and display a set of capacities that persists
across different contexts (Rupert 2011)—supporting this by appealing both to work
in fields such as computer-supported collaborative learning (Dillenbourg et al. 2009)
and computer-supported cooperative work (Olson and Olson 2008) and to their own
current research examining alignment in naturalistic conversation in dyads (Paxton
and Dale 2012).
4 Implications for Research on Distributed Memory
Considered as a whole, the contributions to the special issue have a number of general
implications for both empirical and philosophical work on distributed and extended
memory.
4.1 Implications for Empirical Memory Research
If Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst’s main conclusion—that distributed remembering is
adaptive not only due to its impact on individual cognition but also due to its pro-
motion of sociality—is right, this suggests a broadening of focus for research on
distributed cognition. Taking an example from a different domain, Mercier and Sper-
ber have recently argued that, while it is natural to view reasoning as a means to
improve and extend the agent’s knowledge, viewing it in evolutionary perspective
as a means to influence other agents allows us to account for a range of common
errors and distortions (for example, the confirmation bias) that would otherwise be
difficult to explain (Mercier and Sperber 2011). Analogously, viewing distributed
remembering in evolutionary perspective, as a means to promoting group cohe-
sion, may enable us to explain why we tend to engage in conversational remembering
despite effects (such as social contagion and SS-RIF) which, from the point of view
of individual cognition, can only appear as costs.
At this stage, it remains unclear to what extent differences among differ-
ent distributed/extended theories can make a difference to empirical memory
research (this point likely generalizes to other areas of empirical research). Coming
to grips with the nuances of the different positions that have emerged in the theoret-
ical debates around distributed cognition and extended mind—extended cognition,
embedded cognition, scaffolded cognition, and so on—is likely not a prerequisite for
effective empirical research on the roles played by external resources (whether tech-
nological or social) in remembering. For example, while Arango–Muñoz adopts the
scaffolded cognition framework, his explanation of how agents rely on metacogni-
tive feelings to negotiate the trade-off between internal and external memory would
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seem to be consistent with an extended cognition framework. Similarly, Dahlbäck,
Kristiansson, and Stjernberg’s exploration of the active role of the agent in structuring
his environment so as to be able to adaptively draw on external resources in remem-
bering is not hampered by their decision not to take a stand in the embedded/extended
debate; nor need Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst answer the question of whether (and
when) cognition is genuinely extended in order to develop their explanation of the
adaptivity of conversational remembering. As Clowes remarks, external memory can
influence our cognitive profiles regardless of whether it achieves cognitive incorpora-
tion sufficiently deep to count as part of our minds, so the investigation of the impact
of external memory on remembering need not wait for a resolution of the theoreti-
cal debate over cognitive extension. As far as empirical research is concerned, then,
the value of distributed/extended theories may lie primarily in their emphasis on the
importance of agent-technology and agent-agent couplings for explanations of how
memory works in ecological settings.
4.2 Implications for the Philosophical Debate
Going in the other direction, it is unclear whether empirical evidence can resolve
the debates among extended/embedded/etc. theories. Theiner and Tollefsen, Dale,
and Paxton do argue that empirical TMS research supports the existence of irre-
ducible group-level cognitive systems, while Rupert’s argument against HEC draws
on empirical claims about the functional profiles of biological memory systems. On
the other hand, Clowes (though he argues that HEC may prove more useful than
HEMC in investigating the effects of our increasing reliance on novel forms of exter-
nal memory) points out that, given a case of putatively extended cognition, a theorist
committed to one or another alternative view can always redescribe it so that it is
consistent with his view. Thus it is at this point unclear whether empirical evidence
can help to resolve the debate among the varieties of distributed theory.
A number of the contributions point out that much of the theoretical debate over
HEC has relied on unrealistically simple examples of external memory, such as
Otto’s notebook, and argue that theoretical discussions of distributed/extended
cognition should incorporate more realistic examples of external memory. For
example, Arango–Muñoz points out that Otto’s case is unusual in that he has only
one external memory resource to rely on, whereas real agents typically have to
choose between internal and external memory and among multiple available external
memory resources. Dahlbäck, Kristiansson, and Stjernberg take a similar position,
urging attention to the complexities of the interaction between the agent and the
relevant external memory resources—reliance on external memory is rarely sim-
ply a matter of automatically accepting externally retrieved information, as it is in
the Otto case. And Clowes points out that, when we attend to differences among
memory technologies, we see that there may be a spectrum of cases, ranging from
full-blown incorporation, in which it is relatively plausible that cognitive process-
ing extends into the external resource, to regular reliance without incorporation,
in which, while it is implausible to say that cognitive processing extends into the
resource, use of the resource nonetheless significantly shapes internal cognitive
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processing. As Loader argues, reliance on unrealistically simple examples of external
memory may be due to acceptance of an inadequate conception of biological mem-
ory; attention to more realistic examples of external memory, as well as to differences
between biological and external memory (Rupert 2004; Michaelian 2012a) may rein-
force the move from first-wave, parity-based distributed cognition to second-wave,
complementarity-based distributed cognition (Sutton 2010).
5 Directions for Future Research
Where do we go from here? The special issue suggests a number of questions for
future research on both the metaphysics and the mechanisms of distributed memory
systems.
5.1 Metaphysics of Distributed Memory Systems
What is the relevance of theoretical controversies to empirical memory
research? As noted above, it is at present unclear to what extent theoretical debates
around HEC, HEMC, and related views have implications for empirical memory
research. Future work could explore this question, either showing that there are such
implications or arguing that the theoretical debate is worthwhile even if there are not.
What are the implications of distributed memory research for the ontology of
group cognition? Assuming that Theiner and Tollefsen, Paxton, and Dale are right
that empirical research on alignment and transactive memory may provide evidence
of irreducibly group-level cognition (perhaps consistent with Rupert’s systems-based
approach), this represents a potentially profitable area of research. But even should
it turn out that empirical research cannot provide evidence of irreducibly group-level
cognition, there is clearly a need for the sort of research described by Tollefsen, Pax-
ton, and Dale on the low-level mechanisms responsible for creating and sustaining
TMSs.
5.2 Mechanisms of Distributed Memory Systems
What are the cognitive mechanisms mediating interactions between biologi-
cal memory and external memory? Arango–Muñoz’s metacognitive framework
is designed to explain how agents select among available internal and exter-
nal resources when faced with a given memory task, as well as how they
decide whether to endorse information retrieved from a given internal or exter-
nal resource. While it is empirically grounded, this framework remains spec-
ulative, and future research, perhaps drawing inspiration from existing experi-
mental work on metacognitive feelings, could seek to test and refine it. (Such
research could also examine whether there is a role for metacognitive feelings
in resolving conflicts among information retrieved from internal and external
sources.)
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What are the implications of human communication research for distributed
memory research? The external version of the endorsement problem has both
non-social and social forms, and the latter brings distributed memory research into
contact with human communication research, which looks at the factors influenc-
ing the decision to trust information received from another agent (Sperber et al.
2010). Much of this research is pessimistic with respect to our sensitivity to decep-
tion (Michaelian 2012c); a question for future research is thus whether the results
of human communication research should temper the optimism of Arango–Muñoz’s
view of the reliability of scaffolded memory. Such research should take into account
the non-cognitive factors emphasized by Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst.
What are the mechanisms of mnemonic convergence at the population scale?
As Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst acknowledge, the effectiveness of social contagion
and SS-RIF as means for producing mnemonic convergence may be limited to rela-
tively small groups, so explanations of mnemonic convergence at the level of entire
societies will likely need to invoke additional factors. This suggests a point of contact
between research on distributed memory in small groups and research on the mech-
anisms of collective memory formation at the level of entire societies (for example,
Anastasio et al. 2012), an area which so far is underexplored.
What do entanglement and autonomy mean for episodic and autobiographical
memory? As Clowes suggests, emerging E-memory technologies correspond most
closely to semantic memory. But we can expect them to have important effects not
only on semantic but also on episodic and autobiographical memory. Given the recon-
structive nature of episodic memory, the availability of massive verbatim records
related to personal experiences (for example, through lifelogging (Sellen and Whit-
taker 2010) and related practices) may strongly shape episodic memory. Given the
novel features of E-memory—autonomy and entanglement, in particular—the result-
ing new forms of episodic memory may themselves have novel features, with greater
influence from other agents over the contents of the individual’s personal memories.
How do agent-technology-agent couplings work? Most of the contributions to the
special issue focus primarily either on agent-technology interactions in distributed
cognition or on agent-agent interactions, without investigating patterns that appear
when both types of interaction are operating together. Future research could look
for such patterns, perhaps following up on Arango–Muñoz’s suggestion that epis-
temic feelings may play a mediating role in both cases or employing the sort of
ethnographic methods used by Dahlbäck, Kristiansson, and Stjernberg.
5.3 Normative Questions About Distributed Memory
As Arango–Muñoz and Clowes note in their contributions, the recent debates over
the implications of novel external memory technologies for our mnemonic ability are
broadly reminiscent of much older worries about the implications of writing itself
(voiced, for example, in Plato’s Phaedrus), and indeed, though normative questions
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are beyond the scope of this issue, there is room for future work in this area, in both
epistemology and ethics.
What are the epistemological implications of distributed memory research?
There is an emerging debate over the epistemological implications of extended
cognition, since there appears to be a tension between virtue/credit theories in epis-
temology and HEC (see Pritchard 2010; Vaesen 2011; Kelp 2011; Clark et al. 2012).
While it is too early to anticipate the outcome of this debate, the central example of
external memory will surely play a role here; ideally, the debate will be informed by
empirically sound work on the ways in which agents interact with external memories.
If it turns out that HEC is incompatible with plausible epistemological theories, some
may be prepared to count this as evidence in favour of Rupert’s alternative HEMC.
What are the ethical implications of distributed memory research? What are the
ethical implications of our increasing reliance on novel forms of external memory?
So far there is little work in this area, but parallels with ethical issues around mem-
ory enhancement (Liao and Sandberg 2008) suggest that it represents a potentially
fruitful avenue of inquiry. For example, Loader points out that literally extended
memory raises the possibility that one agent’s memories could be accessed or stolen
by another, a scenario which raises interesting ethical questions.
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